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ABSTRACT 
This article analyzes the Polish SolidDULW\¶Vpropaganda practice. Drawing from a discursive 
archive comprising cultural artefacts, the movement¶V policy statements, and augmented by 
interviews, this Foucault-inspired study reveals how µpropaganda RISURWHVW¶EHFDPHa 
µSLOODU¶ RIWKH6ROLGDULW\PRYHPHQW¶VFDPSDLJQLQJ. This study analyzes propaganda 
strategies and tactics for mobilization and political engagement among Poles, and how 
campaigning aided power shifts between the movement and the authorities. Contextualizing 
this analysis in the Sovietized settings, this study shows that propaganda was inherent to 
6ROLGDULW\¶V transgressive and subversive campaigning in multiple areas of the movement¶V
agency: mobilization and support building, construction of collective identities, coalition-
building, issues management and policy making, and implementation. Finally, I argue, that 
the qualities of 6ROLGDULW\¶Vpropaganda were culturally-grounded, based on the self-
presentation strategies as well as the zeitgeist belief in HQJDJHPHQWRIZRUNHUV¶ZLWK trade 
unionism rather than policies of the state socialist regime.  
Key words: social movement, campaigning, propaganda, protest, Foucault  
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CAMPAIGNING OF THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite a burgeoning body of research on the Polish Solidarity, Garton-Ash (2006) notes the 
scope for further analysis of the movement. TKLVLVSDUWLFXODUO\WUXHRI6ROLGDULW\¶V
campaigning. The recent scholarship tends to conceptualize VRFLDOPRYHPHQWV¶campaigning 
within liberal media landscapes. For example, Cammaerts¶ (2012) advances the concept of 
mediated opportunity structure, the focus of which is analysis of movements in environments 
ultra-saturated by the media. He addresses the logic of protest in democratic, capitalist and 
techno-savvy settings, but it has limitations once confronted with the task of historicizing 
civic campaigning within authoritarian regimes such as the state socialism of 1980s Poland. 
In the Sovietized media landscape ³citizens lacked the opportunity to express or to discuss 
their opinions on political issues, since there was no freedom of speech or independent media 
channels open to voice such a freedom´ (Aleksandrowicz et al., 2010, p. 158).  
Despite the above-mentioned constraints, Solidarity¶VFDPSDLJQLQJ aided forms of political 
engagement (Mason, 1982). Given limited cross-disciplinary debate on communicative 
practices among social PRYHPHQWV¶ (Downing, 2008), this article builds on various strands of 
scholarship and provides insights into the PRYHPHQW¶Vcampaigning during µthe carnival of 
6ROLGDULW\¶era (August 1980-December 1981). This study focuses on analysis of propaganda 
and, by problematizing it as a discursive practice¹, it contributes to the body of knowledge on 
campaigning in the following ways: it positions the organization of propaganda on the map of 
practices LQKHUHQWWR6ROLGDULW\¶VFDPSDLJQLQJit historicizes propaganda through the 
campaigners¶ lived experiences, it empirically substantiates the concept of µpropaganda of 
protest¶, and critically analyzes power relations inherent to 6ROLGDULW\¶Vcampaigning. Finally, 
the relevance of the Foucauldian approach undertaken in study for analysis of other social 
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movements, historical and more contemporary ones, is discussed. The primary contribution 
of this article is to the field of critical communication studies, whereas its secondary 
contribution falls into the analysis of social movements and civic cultures in Poland.  
CAMPAIGNING: PR-PROPAGANDA OF DISSENT AND PROTEST 
A departure point for this analysis LVWKHUHFRJQLWLRQWKDW6ROLGDULW\¶Vcampaign was based on 
multiple trajectories of actions and, because of its networked organization, can be described 
DVDµLQIRUPDWLRQand influence FDPSDLJQ¶0DQKHLPSGHILQHVWKLVWHUP as ³a 
systematic, sequential and multi-faceted effort by one actor to inform or to influence the 
perceptions, preferences or DFWLRQVRIVRPHRWKHUDFWRUV´. /¶(WDQJ, p. 32) points out 
that in terms of basic terminologies, social PRYHPHQWVFDQEHXQGHUVWRRGDV³long-term 
campaigns´³activism as specific historical events´, and public relations (PR) as ³strategic 
communicatiRQ´. Simultaneously, she acknowledges that these categories are open to re-
interpretation. On the one hand, this approach allows anchor public relations as one of the 
pillars in the organization of 6ROLGDULW\¶VFDPSDLJn. On the other hand, it enables historicize 
this form of persuasive communication as a practice pertaining to the themes of mobilization, 
political engagement, communicative exchanges, and policy influence.   
The central premise of this article is that propaganda and public relations (PR) underpin 
dissent and protest as political agency and, by virtue of its mobilizing affordances, is one of 
the early emergent componHQWVRI6ROLGDULW\¶VSURWHVW. Following Moloney¶V (2006, p. 6) 
argument that public relations is a soft form of propaganda, this article recognizes that 
imaginaries of this discursive practice are linked to cultural settings for its performance 
(Corner, 2007). It is within the contemporary scholarship on public relations that useful ways 
RIFRQFHSWXDOL]LQJWKHSLOODURI6ROLGDULW\¶VFDPSDLJQing, that this article focuses on, are 
found. To remain faithful to the terminologies in the field, this article follows the writing 
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convention - µ35-SURSDJDQGD¶- which both, encapsulates public relations as a soft form of 
propaganda and broadens the analytical scope, as it requires to interpret this practice through 
the prism of FDPSDLJQHUV¶FXOWXUDOVHWWLQJV (Moloney, 2006, p. 6).   
Coombs and Holladay (2012) note the change of focus in research away from µcorporate¶ and 
µgovernment¶ towards the practice of public relations by µsocial movements¶. This shift has 
triggered the need to re-think terminologies in the field. For example, the term µSROLWLFDO
public relations¶is used more broadly than µDFWLYLVWSXEOLFUHODWLRQV¶DVDdescriptor of the 
practice (Karlberg, 1996; Dozier & Lauzen, 2000; Taylor et al., 2001). Elsewhere, 
Holtzhausen (2007) writes about activism as a corporate PR practice, whilst Berger & Reber 
(2005) demonstrate how activists use digital media in public relations.  
While analytically useful, contemporary public relations terminologies are problematic for 
this study from two reasons. First, during the Cold War, in the Sovietized part of Europe, the 
term µpropaganda¶ZDVused as a dominant signifier of persuasive communication, and had no 
conceptual alternatives6HFRQGµGLVVHQW¶DQGµSURWHVW¶entail challenging the status quo, 
therefore analysis of Solidarity¶V campaigning requires a framework sensitive to power 
relations. The term µDFWLYLVWSXEOLFUHODWLRQV¶ tends to be used generically, whereas µSURWHVW¶ 
and µGissent¶ are particular types of political action. To align them with campaigning, I turn 
to the ideas of µPR-propaganda of dissent¶ and µPR-propaganda of protest¶. The first term 
refers to ³the dissemination of ideas, commentaries, and policies through PR techniques in 
order to change current, dominant thinking and behaviour in discrete economic, political and 
cultural areas of public life´ whereas the latter ³is also persuasive communication, but not 
principally about ideas, behaviours and policies. Instead, it persuades in order to implement 
those ideas, behaviours and policies into law, regulation and other forms of executive action´ 
(ANONYMIZED, 2013, pp. 4-5).  
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In addition to terminological considerations, this study is positioned against scholarship that 
draws from social theory to historicize PR-propaganda. This approach has been undertaken 
by scholars in the field (Holtzhausen, 2011; Demetrious, 2013; Anderson, 2017), the works 
of which have generated insights into the ways in which this practice evolved over the years. 
This study, however, can be mapped out more precisely against the recent work produced by 
/¶(WDQJ as she draws from the analysis of Touraine to explore historicity in public 
relations by social movements. While Touraine et al¶V (1983) classical volume on Solidarity 
pays no attention to campaigning practices, elsewhere, Arnason¶V (1986, p. 144) reading of 
his works reveals that Touraine views communication as ³conflictual appropriation of 
historicity by collective actors who struggle for control of LW´. )RU/¶(WDQJWKLVLVDQ
argument for the importance of studying PR-propaganda by social movements as a practice 
mediating social change. Following these insights, this study is located on the continuum of 
research on PR-propaganda in campaigning but, unlike in the existing scholarship, it focuses 
on a social movement, the political action of which unfolded in Poland during Sovietized era.  
DISSENT MEDIA VERSUS PROPAGANDAIZED DISSENT 
Solidarity has been analyzed within many academic fields. Yet, scholarship tends not to 
bridge scattered research on the movement, and scholars exploring Solidarity tend to remain 
LQµGLVFLSOLQDU\ VLORV¶For instance, media studies credit Solidarity for the advancement of the 
oppositional public sphere, arguing that 6ROLGDULW\¶V µdissent media¶ circulated the 
oppositional ideas (Curry, 1990; Pfetsch & Voltmer, 2012). At the turn of 1970s and 1980s 
public spheres in Poland were highly polarized. Oftentimes, political action in the µofficial¶ 
public sphere mobilized the resistance ZLWKLQµoppositional¶ DQGµDOWHUQDWLYH¶SXEOLFVSKHUHV
(Jakubowicz, 1990). Dissent media, therefore, was the focus of media studies research.  
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Conversely, with a few exceptions (àDZQLF]DNHWDO, 2003; Jowett & 2¶'RQQHOO, 2006; Fras, 
2010), communication studies have paid little attention to Solidarity. Social theorists and 
political studies (Staniszkis, 1984; Zielonka, 1986) only make references to µpropaganda 
wars¶ between Solidarity and the authorities. Kubik (1994) analysis is close to the approach 
undertaken in this study, as it focuses on symbolic and discursive features RIWKH6ROLGDULW\¶V
movement. However, his analysis focuses on the power of cultural meanings, but pays 
limited attention to the campaigning dynamics using those symbols. All in all, literature 
review reveals dispersed features of analysis of WKH6ROLGDULW\¶VFDPSDLJQLQJ)XUWKHULW 
reveals campaigning pillars: reliance RQµGLVVHQWPHGLD¶ and reliance on µ35-propaganda of 
GLVVHQW¶DQGµ35-SURSDJDQGDRISURWHVW¶. This study focuses on the latter.  
FOUCAULT, CULTURE & PR-PROPAGANDA 
To trace the Polish Solidarity movement¶V PR-propaganda practices, I turn to the oeuvre of 
Michele Foucault. )RXFDXOW¶V µanalytical toolbox¶ has been applied to analysis of PR-
propaganda, and approached DVµGLVFXUVLYHSUDFWLFH¶ (Motion & Leith, 2007). In this article, 
his concepts strengthen analysis by foregrounding cultural features of PR-propaganda, and by 
revealing how this discursive practice shaped power relations. To compellingly account for 
cultural sensitivities of the 6ROLGDULW\¶Vera, the conceptual framework for this study is made 
up of )RXFDXOW¶Vtake on power, culture and discourse. Following Foucault (1967, p. 582), I 
argue, that Solidarity created a politically unique µFXOWXUDOFRQMXQFWXUH¶. Shaping it and being 
shaped by it, PR-propaganda was an articulation of a culture of resistance, in which protest 
and dissent were central to the Solidarity PRYHPHQW¶Vpolitical action.  
This analysis draws IURP)RXFDXOW¶Vviews on power. For Foucault (1978) power lies within 
systems of control and focuses on disciplining people. Indeed, the initial source of 
Solidarity¶V power lied in resistance to institutional conditioning and in collective political 
RE-9,6,7,1*µ62/,'$512ĝû¶ 
 
7 
 
action. On the one hand, its campaigning was prompted by the unmatched expectations with 
public policies: growing inequalities, falsehoods in the state-controlled media about 
economy, corruption, poor standards of health and safety, and declining standards of living. 
On the other hand, the August strike was initiated by a network of µagitators¶ who mobilized 
this political action (Mason, 1982). In terms of power effect, 6ROLGDULW\¶VPR-propaganda is 
thought of DV³a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more 
than as a negative instance whose fuQFWLRQLVUHSUHVVLRQ´ (Foucault, 1980, p. 119).   
Foucault et al. (2000) distinguishes power derived from relationships of exchange from 
power derived from communicative relationships. This article focuses on the latter, bearing in 
mind that in unfolding the dynamics of power relations - resistance to power and limits of 
power - define PR-propaganda. Given that this article pays attention to the dynamics of 
power relations inherent in the practice of PR-propaganda, in doing so, it extends its 
analytical capacity by adopting the notion of µFRXQWHU-FRQGXFW¶ (Foucault, 2007). Using PR-
propaganda to voice protest exemplifies µFRXQWHU-FRQGXFW¶ZHOO,t illustrates how Solidarity 
became a subversive and transgressive producer of discourses, particularly how PR-
propaganda became the act of counter-conduct against Polish government public policies.  
METHODOLOGY  
This interpretivist study aims to analyse the practice of PR-propaganda. Building on from the 
conceptual framework, this study is rooted in Foucault¶V power network ontology as, 
particularly in the absence of the organized structures, the participants of this study viewed 
the emerging 6ROLGDULW\¶VFampaign through the prism of networks. For Foucault, as noted by 
Eriksson (2005, p. 598), ³the ontology of power can be approached only through a whole 
historical network, which implies various forms of knowledge, institutional practices, 
juridical and economic systems, and cultural relationships. These constitute what Foucault 
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calls µWKHQHWZRUNRISRZHU¶´. Because this analysis focuses on campaigning, it subscribes to 
the worldview, in which the practice of propaganda unfolded within human networks.  
 
To further bridge the gap between the conceptual framework and findings, the epistemic 
position of this study is embedded in the study of discourse. For Foucault (1972, p. 49) 
GLVFRXUVHVDUH³SUDFWLFHVWKDWV\VWHPDWLFDOO\IRUPWKHREMHFWVDQGVXEMHFWVRIZKLFKWKH\
VSHDN´As well as thinking about the Solidarity¶V campaign as a network, by the virtue of 
PR-pURSDJDQGD¶VSRZHUHIIHFWV, this study is underpinned by the notion of discursive practice 
in which µWRVSHDNLVWRGRVRPHWKLQJ¶)RXFDXOWSThis sensibility translates to 
performative and communicative features of propaganda as traceable ³rules which are quite 
specific to a particular time, space, and cultural setting´ 2¶)DUUHUHOOS 
Bearing in PLQG)RXFDXOW¶Vtake on knowledge, this exploratory study was designed to trace 
the organization of the campaign networks, and strategies and tactics as the manifestations of 
the propaganda practice itself. Following the review of literature, four research objectives 
have been developed: 1) to analyse contextual features of 6ROLGDULW\¶VPR-propaganda; 2) to 
map out key actors driving PR-propaganda; 3) to analyse how communicative strategies and 
tactics were linked to the movement¶Vgoals; 4) to reveal transformational aspects of 
6ROLGDULW\¶V PR-propaganda. A multi-sourced archive, covering campaigning practices was 
collected at the European Centre of Solidarity in *GDĔVN. The archive comprises interviews, 
media artefacts (e.g. notations, digitalized interviews), policies and outputs of PR-propaganda 
practice (205 artefacts). The archive was evidenced into non-verbal and oral elements 
/¶(WDQJ 2010). To cross-examine the non-verbal artefacts, interviews with Solidarity 
members were conducted (July, 2012- August, 2013) with a view to unpack localized 
meanings, intentions and terminologies underpinning practices, for example, the usage of 
labels such as µSXEOLF UHODWLRQV¶YHUVXVµSURSDJDQGD¶ Among discursive strands explored in 
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the interviews were: identities of the movement, the organization of campaigning, PR-
propaganda strategies and tactics as well as links them DQGWKHPRYHPHQW¶V goals.  
The field testing stage, mainly through the informal interviews with the European Solidarity 
&HQWUHLQ*GDĔVN led to the identification of Solidarity¶V members engaged in the practice of 
PR-propaganda. A snowballing technique was used to recruit participants, all of whom 
beloQJHGWR6ROLGDULW\¶VPR-propaganda networks. The fieldwork practicalities dictated the 
necessity to divide some interviews: 9 interviews (1,5-hour average length) with 6 participants 
(Tab. 1.), all of which were conducted in Polish. Their interpretation remained closer to 
English as the targeted language. Given that discursive material was collected, the procedure 
of triangulation was extended to non-discursive material as the materialization of PR-
propaganda traces. This was done to cross-examine participants interviews against policy and 
media artefacts to generate insights addressing research objectives in more supportive way. 
Field notes facilitated making connections between data sets making up the archive.  
Subsequently, discourse analysis was applied to the collected archive. The procedure for this 
practice-oriented discourse analysis focused on the organization, and strategies and tactics 
underpinning propaganda. To DGGUHVVµKRZV¶ DQGµZK\V¶ of PR-propaganda, in the analysis 
process, contextual features of discourse on the practice were considered. First, +RRN¶V
WDNHRQ)RXFDXOW¶VGLVFRXUVHDQDO\VLVWKLVVWXG\DSDUWIURPpraxeology, accounts for: history 
in the contextualization of discourse; conditioning the statements emerging and discourse as 
material connected to textual elements embedded in the practice. Second, JlJHUDQG0DLHU¶V
(2009) outline of Foucauldian discourse analysis was paid attention to, particularly in relation 
to the unpacking of discursive strands; discursive limits and techniques for narrowing themes 
down; discursive fragments; discursive entanglements; collective symbols; discursive planes; 
discursive events and contexts; discursive position. Third3DUNHU¶V (1994) use of Foucauldian 
discourse analysis facilitated the analytic process in the examining of alternatives modes of 
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expression that are not used, or search for as unspoken features of discourse, in a process of 
µIUHHDVVRFLDWLRQ¶7KHUHGXFWLRQRIGLVcursive statements and the search for utterances 
focusing on performative features of the Solidarity campaign enabled me to summarize the 
propaganda strategies and tactics in the Tab. 2 on pp. 32-33.  
Participant Date of interview Campaign role  Time of interview 
Anna July, 2012 Translator, member 169:11 min. 
Zygmunt July, 2012 Poster Group, member 83:06 min. 
Jerzy August, 2012 Artist, member 75: 12 min.  
Janusz May, 2013 Spokesperson, member 58:00 min.  
Giedymin August, 2012 Spokesperson, member 63:07 min.  
Joanna June, 2013  Translator, member 45:12 min.  
 
DISCURSIVE CONTEXTS  
I start off the presentation of findings with an outline of contextual features of SoOLGDULW\¶V
campaigning. On 14 August 1980, a network of dissidents, led by Bodgan Borusewicz, 
initiated a protest LQWKH*GDĔVN6KLS\DUG, an industrial compound employing 17,000 people. 
Soon after its outbreak, /HFK:DáĊVDassumed the leadership of the protest. The impetus to 
the outbreak of the strike had been the JRYHUQPHQW¶Vannouncement of a pricing policy, 
which became a µshort-cut¶ for inefficiencies of the state socialism, and a tipping point for the 
escalation of issues underpinning unsatisfactory economic and industrial affairs. The news 
about the strike circulated the region, mobilizing other state-run enterprises to join in. The 
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state-run news agency and the media denied the news (MKS, 1980a). On 16 August, the 
Inter-factory Strike Committee (the MKS) was formed to coordinate the protest. The 
protesters embarked on a campaign to shift the JRYHUQPHQW¶s policies orientation. Faced with 
the hostile media landscape, however, their campaign took some unexpected turns.  
Similarly, as in the work of Kubik (1994), while painting the background for 6ROLGDULW\¶V 
campaigning, participants of this study placed the strike on the continuity of dissent 
preceding the August protests. Even though the Sovietized regime in Poland was designed to 
prevent citizens from autonomous political action, the outbreak of the strike was attributed by 
them to µOLYHGmemories¶. These included street SURWHVWVLQ*GDĔVN8UVXVDQG5DGRP 
(1976) and their brutal pacifications by the state authorities; the clandestine dissent driven by 
µVHFRQGFLUFXODWLRQ¶and samizdat (e.g. µBond¶µ9RLFH¶µ&ULWLTXH¶µ:RUNHU¶, µ3XOV¶) 
produced by, among others, the Committee for the Workers¶ Defence (the KOR) or human 
right groups, e.g. the Movement for the Defence of Human and Civic Rights (the ROBCiO). 
Finally, the mobilizing significance of Jan Paul II to the mood setting for the protest was 
foregrounded too. The PRSH¶V1979 state visit to his homeland, the broadcast of which was 
exceptionally permitted by the authorities, became a rare opportunity to disseminate ³/HWthy 
VSLULWGHVFHQGDQGUHQHZWKHIDFHRIWKHODQGWKLVODQG´± a spiritual message interpreted as 
the statement of support for political dissent in Poland (Anna, interview, 2012).  
PROPAGANDA AS ZEITGEIST  
 
In August 1980, leaders of the Shipyard strike chose campaigning strategies, keeping the 
previous political action in mind. It was uttered³:DáĊVDZDVRQHRIWKHOHDGHUVGXULQJWKH
1970 protests and he knew what would have happened if the authorities used force. In the 
light of those memories, he tried persuasion, and attempted a dialogue with the authorities´ 
(Anna, interview, 2012). Of all the themes in the discourse on Solidarity¶V campaigning, the 
RE-9,6,7,1*µ62/,'$512ĝû¶ 
 
12 
 
naming practices was culturally-grounded. Statements and utterances about the use of 
persuasive communication were re-occurring. The term µSXEOLFUHODWLRQV¶, however, was seen 
as being a dislocated descriptor, as ³none of the 6ROLGDULW\¶Vspokespeople described their 
practice as µPR¶¶ (Anna, interview, 2012). Yet, the relational logic featured in the discourse: 
participants discussed dialogue as means to political engagement. Simultaneously, they spoke 
about µYLVXDOSURSDJDQGD¶Giedynim, interview, RUµDFWV RISURSDJDQGD¶=\JPXQW
interview, 2012) as pillars of the campaign. The term µSropaganda¶ mirrors the zeitgeist in the 
approach public engagement, but the practices were unique acts of self-presentation.  
 
There was consent among the participants about polarized µXV¶YHUVXVµWKHP¶ logic) 
positioning of 6ROLGDULW\¶VFDPSDLJQ against government¶V propaganda. Descriptors such as 
µspokesmenVKLS¶RU µLQIRUPDWLRQFDPSDLJQ¶ allowed them to distance their practices from 
those of their antagonists. Another way to differentiate WKHPRYHPHQW¶Vpropaganda was 
through highlighting inclusivity and accuracy as campaigning features: the former was 
GHVFULEHGDV³community based´ (Anna, interview, ZKHUHDVWKHODWWHUDV³well-
VRXUFHG´ (Janusz, interview, 2013). These insights align with the µVSHDNLQJWKHWUXWK
SULQFLSOH¶ as the movement felt duty to fact-based campaigning (Smolar, 2013, p. 132). For 
example, the former Solidarity spokesmen revealed: ³I was amazed as I did not feel that I 
needed to prepare myself to speak to journalists. I simply spoke what I thought was 
necessary, assuming that I should speak the truth, nothing but the truth, but perhaps not 
DOZD\VWKHHQWLUHWUXWK´ (Janusz, interview, 2013). Through the commitment to truth-telling, 
campaigners assumed moral µhigh groundV¶. Using the notion of µrighteousness¶ was a 
deliberate move: it was designed to appeal to largely Catholic citizenry and gave the 
campaign the initial legitimacy.  
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MOBILIZATION OF THE AUGUST 1980 STRIKE  
 
The process of the institutionalization of propaganda on a wider scale began when the 
Solidarity movement was registered as a trade union (p. 21). Prior to that, the campaign for 
the formation of a trade union was mobilized by a small network of dissidents. Its early 
stages were reported by participants as being in the state of flux and communicative roles 
among the protesters had a propensity to overlap. Also, at that time, the right to public 
meetings was restricted ± strikes as acts of political engagement, had consequences far 
exceeding the significance of protests in liberal democracies. 
 
On 14 August 1980, industrial workers reacted to the announcement of the governmental 
policy. The agitative public speeches of a group of dissidents mobilized the occupational 
strike in the Shipyard. Using leafleting, its protagonists targeted the 6KLS\DUG¶Vworkforce 
and management with the message of the strike outbreak and the QHHGIRUZRUNHUV¶ULJKWV
The campaign strategy ZDVEDVHGRQµVSLOO-over effects¶and industrial negotiations with the 
government. In an open letter, protesters called for the authorities to start negotiations. The 
ad hoc Information Centre was set up in Warsaw where Jacek .XURĔ of the KOR handled 
media relations with foreign correspondents, e.g. µRadio Free Europe¶. Western diplomats 
based in Warsaw were targeted too. The news about the strike circulated fast DQGWKH*GDĔVN
protest became an example to follow for enterprises nation-wide (Anna, interview, 2012).  
 
The campaign to win the hearts and minds pressed on. The Shipyard became a confined 
contestation site, on the walls of which murals and slogans marked discontent. The protest 
banners occupied public spaces. The Shipyard neighborhoods rapidly turned into µFRPPXQLW\
activism VLWHV¶, supporting the protesting workers. The response to the denial of the protest by 
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the state media was a public display of slogans throughout *GDĔVN (e.g. µOnly patience and 
solidarity can bring us victory!¶RUµThe strike goes on!¶)  - all calling for the strike action to 
continue. In the meantime, supporters of the protest decorated the Shipyard gates with images 
of Jan Paul II, national flags and flowers in colors signifying national identities. The message 
was simple but powerful: the local strike was being escalated to a national campaign.  
 
Following the formation of the MKS, the µ21 Demands¶ were drafted by Maciej 
Grzywaczewski and Arkadiusz Rybicki. Displayed on wooden boards, they became the 
protest manifesto including the following demands: formation of trade union, respect for 
freedom of speech, right to the strike action without repercussions and releasing of the 
prisoners of conscience (MKS, 1980b). Once articulated using self-presentation tactics, the 
protesters continued voicing their demands: leafleting and media statements were put out by 
the team from µThe 6ROLGDULW\6WULNH,QIRUPDWLRQ%XOOHWLQ¶(1980). Anti-Soviet sentiments 
underpinned campaign tactics. To amplify WKHµ21 Demands¶, the slogan µ21x Yes¶that in 
Polish political culture signifies the rigged 1946 referendum, pathing the way to Soviet 
regime in Poland, was appropriated.  
 
From the outset, the campaign focused on policy ideas. As previously noted, the campaign 
goals matched the conceptualization of propaganda practice E\VRFLDOPRYHPHQWV¶, as it was 
geared towards policies implementation. The discourse on the propaganda practice revealed 
that the protesters called for revisiting of industrial relations by JLYLQJZRUNHUV¶ concessions 
for self-governance. The campaigners emphasized that political engagement with policy 
proposals was pushed, for example, via media relations, by appealing to public good and the 
µdignity in labour¶ideal (Janusz, interview, 2013). These, and other policy ideas, gained a 
greater tracking when the MKS was formed. One of the press statements chronicles this 
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event: µAs a result of an agreement between striking enterprises across the coast, on 16 
August, WKH0.6ZDVIRUPHGLQWKH*GDĔVN6KLS\DUGIts aim is to coordinate demands and 
strike action¶ (MKS, 1980b). From 16 August, 1980 the MKS became a µdominant coalition¶ 
and a body driving the implementation of the mRYHPHQW¶VHPHUJLQJLGHDOV 
 
MEDIA RELATIONS 
 
Despite limited campaigning resources, protesters kept the strike action up. To continue 
adding pressure on the authorities, the protesters used a mixture of propaganda strategies and 
tactics. In spite of political news blackouts, the MKS Presidium proactively conducted media 
relations, primarily targeting Western media, as they were more trustworthy in comparison to 
state media. An estimated number of 400 local journalists and foreign correspondents 
reported from the Shipyard. The PRYHPHQW¶Vmedia relations strategy was underpinned by 
uniqueness of the protests, benefitting the campaign in terms of media access as political 
action on this scale came to many as a surprise. The following statement accounts for the ease 
in the conduct of media relations: ³In 1980-81 we did not to have to look for journalists. I can 
recall when in February 1981 I travelled to France to meet up with trade unionists. To my 
surprise, I had been asked, µ:hat does Solidarity do to attract media DWWHQWLRQ¶"We do not do 
much, I answered. We have been changing political situation in Poland¶´(Janusz, interview, 
2013). In addition, the protesters and supporters engaged with the media: vox populi and 
word-of- mouth aided the conduct of media relations and gaining support for the movement.  
 
In terms of organization, media relations was conducted by a dedicated spokesperson and a 
WHDPSURGXFLQJµThe Information Bulletin: Solidarity¶On 21 August, Lech %ądkowski, a 
publicist and a political writer, presented the protesters with a letter of support from the local 
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branch of the Polish Writers Association (1980). Given his credibility, derived from artisan 
affiliation, %ąGNRZVNL became a spokesperson for the movement, and played a central role in 
the conduct of media relations. His seat on the MKS Presidium allowed unlimited access to 
the strike leaders. Done this way, the practice of propaganda gained a strategic position. 
%ąGNRZVNL died in 1984, but his memoirs reveal the following insight into media relations:  
 
³In my view we had a very good relationship with journalists. Because I did 
not have time to monitor the media (and trust me, it was difficult to access 
news media), on occasion, I relied on media clippings and briefs produced by 
journalists. Both local and foreign journalists were helping us out. Among the 
foreign correspondents, the most active were those of the Associated Press, 
Reuters and the BBC. I could rely on their insightful media summaries´.  
 
Because the Solidarity¶ campaign was under-resourced, by acting as µpublic journalists¶ 
(Merritt, 1999), reporters supported the 6ROLGDULW\¶VFDPSDLJQAmong media relations tactics 
were media statements, multi-lingual press conferences, media briefings and live interviews. 
The media relations strategy further exemplifies the strategic approach to propaganda 
practice: the strike leaders commented on the events, for example, :DáĊVD gave his first 
interview to the BBC and to Jarmo Jääskeläinen, a documentary film-maker.  
 
Despite the hostile media landscape, Solidarity¶VFDPSDLJQ generated favorable publicity at 
home. Facilitated by the network of personal influence, news stories about the strike were 
produced for the local press, e.g. µ%DOWLF'DLO\¶ published µThe Self-JRYHUQDQFH¶column. Yet, 
limited ground was gained to access national broadcast media ZLWKWKHPRYHPHQW¶VPHVVDJHV
(Janusz, 2013). Concerns over the silencing of the protest were addressed by circulating 
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foreign media stories about the strike at home: clippings of foreign news media stories about 
the movement were publicly displayed in the Shipyard. On 23 August, Konrad BieOLĔVNLDQG
Krzysztof Wyszkowski produced the first issue of µThe Strike Information Bulletin¶, which 
carried out reprints of news stories from foreign media, policy statements, appeals, messages 
of support and commentaries on the strike from across Poland. 
 
MAKING OF THE MOVE0(17¶6,'(17,7,(6 
 
In addition to extensive media relations6ROLGDULW\¶Vpropaganda shaped WKHPRYHPHQW¶V
collective identities. The advancement of µthe VHOI¶Foucault, 1988) was attributed by 
participants to WKHPRYHPHQWV¶collective interests and ethos of their political action. Those 
features were captured in WKHPRYHPHQW¶VYLVXDOLGHQWLW\- a symbol expressing the protest as 
a spectacle of numbers and a celebration of community spirit. The notions RIµVROLGDULW\¶, 
µFRPPXQLW\¶ were its main sub-texts. Jerzy Janiszewski, the designer of this visual identity, 
was looking for an artistic expression to mirror public mood. Drawing inspiration from the 
strike¶V community spirit, he discussed its aesthetics with Krzysztof Kacprzyk and created the 
IDPRXVµ6ROLGDULW\¶YLVXDOLGHQWLW\, later appropriated as the name of the labor union. Its 
attributes were drawn up from national symbols and signified the blood spilled during the 
1970s protest (Jerzy, interview, 2012).  
 
Designing of the visual identity required creativity as its makers were limited to the DIY 
work and resources available in the Shipyard. Following its emergence, the visual identity 
was used in media relations, featured in foreign media and was adopted by the campaigners 
and supporters abroad. 7KH6ROLGDULW\¶Vvisual identity was aligned with the title of the strike 
bulletin, but its execution was in Janiszewski¶VKDQGV. His design featured on self-made 
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posters, t-shirts and it was used by journalists (Jerzy, interview, 2012). This symbol stood for 
unity and resistance against government policies. In Polish political culture, the so-called, 
µSolidaryca¶OHWWHULQJEHcame a design icon on its own right.  
 
During the August strike, religious and national identity symbols were used to the 
propagandistic ends, e.g. posters of Jan Paul II or the µ$nchor¶ (a visual identity of the Polish 
Home Army). To commemorate the 1970s protests, the protesters erected a cross with an 
inscription of a powerful message adopted from Lord Byron³For freedom's battle once 
begun; Bequeath'd by bleeding sire to son; Though baffled oft is never won´. Those 
culturally-grounded symbols of spirituality, national identities and freedom were circulated 
by the campaigners, aiding the reactivation of romanticized myth of Polish struggles for 
freedom and liberation from foreign, in this case Soviet subordination.  
 
Further, propaganda techniques were used to reinforce the µSHDFHIXO¶ identity of the 
movement. It was of paramount importance to the strike leaders that the movement was 
known to public opinion for peaceful political engagement. The following techniques were 
used to facilitate it: alcohol prohibition instructions and leaflets were circulated, broadcasted 
mass service and music performances. For example, on 25 August, Chopin and Moniuszko¶V 
repertoire was performed in the Shipyard by the *GDĔVN Philharmonic Orchestra 
(Information Bulletin, 1980). The emotive campaign appeals were articulated by music 
performances of protest songs, e.g. µThe hymn of the Bar Confederates¶. The appropriation of 
arts to the campaign foregrounded antagonistic Polish-Russian sensibilities and became an 
expression of aesthetic µotherness¶ (Ross, 2002). ,QWKHPHDQWLPH:DáĊVDhimself 
FRQWULEXWHGWRWKHPDNLQJRIWKHPRYHPHQW¶VSHDFHIXOLGHQWLW\KLVcharismatic speeches 
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broadcasted to the protesters aimed at evoking a sense of hope. The sense of peaceful identity 
was also reinforced by the incoming messages from the supporters (Anna, interview, 2012).  
 
COLAITION-BUILDING, GOVERNMENT RELATIONS & DOCUMENTARIES  
 
The protest campaign was successful because of its scope: the outbreak of the strike resulted 
in a joint strike action among state-managed enterprises. Four days into the strike, the MKS 
represented 156 enterprises, but towards the end of the strike action it represented 
approximately 3,500 enterprises. The MKS formed a coalition of support beyond industrial 
enterprises: it included the Catholic Church, the Young Poland Movement and the KOR, to 
name but a few. According to Harris and Fleisher (2005), coalition-building is the most 
powerful tactic in policy driven campaigns. The emerging movement gained support from 
several directions, including support from the French CFDT Centrales, the American 
Federation of Labour and the Congress of Industrial Organizations. This coalition aided 
legitimacy and allowed the MKS leverage in industrial negotiations (Anna, interview, 2012).  
 
The protesters¶ bridging strategy aimed at gaining support of influential actors who acted as 
µFDPSDLJQLQWHUPHGLDULHV¶. For instance, despite hesitation, the Catholic Church backed the 
protesters. Statements issued by the Church officials and masses celebrated for the workers 
protesting across Poland are illustrative of its engagement with Solidarity¶Vcampaign, for 
example: µOn 17 August, 1980 at 10.30 am, in the Gdynia Shipyard, begun a mass celebrated 
by the Prelate, Dr H. Jastak. It was a service for intentions of the ZRUNHUV¶who died in 1970 
and for those workers striking today. The service was attended by crowds from several cities. 
It was attended by 12,000 people¶ (Information Bulletin, 1980).  
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During the August strike, the Solidarity campaign used other types of cultural intermediaries. 
Despite the denial of the strike action, on 31 August, the authorities gave in to mounting 
public opinion pressures and agreed to industrial negotiations with the protesters. This stage 
of the campaign was aided by µexternal advisors¶ supporting negotiations with a high-profile 
committee. Under the leadership of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, advisors advocated the adoption of 
µ21 Demands¶ as the orientation for public policy. This campaign tactic aimed at broadening 
WKHPRYHPHQW¶VSXEOLFDSSHDO among multiple occupations and industries. The negotiations 
provided another insight into the diversity of campaign practices: in the socialist regime 
lobbying was not a routinized government relations practice, but these industrial negotiations 
supported by the advisers, carried out marks of influence on policy makers.  
 
The industrial negotiation expanded the Solidarity¶VFDPSDLJQing to new avenues. A special 
place in the discourse on the practice of propaganda was attributed to documentaries. Kilborn 
(2006, p. 203) argues that documentary-film making and campaigning are µXQHDV\
EHGIHOORZV¶,n the case of Solidarity, however, the two practices grew into a µsymbiotic 
relationship¶ The Association of Polish Film-Makers was given access to chronicle events 
unfolding in the Shipyard. AnGU]HM:DMGD¶VHQGRUVHPHQWRIWKis initiative was protected it 
from being a sting operation. Alongside the regional µ793*GDĔVN¶QHZVFUHZILOP-makers 
had exclusive access to negotiations, and its footage was turned into the documentary, 
µ:RUNHUVµ¶E\$QGU]HM+RGDNRZVNLDQG$QGU]HM=DMąF]NRZVNLDespite censorship, 
nation-wide screenings of this feature aided raising awareness of thH6ROLGDULW\¶Vpolicy goals 
(Anna, interview, 2012). The making of this documentary illustrates endorsement by a third-
party, which later, became a wide-spread tactic as Solidarity¶VFDPSDLJQing was endorsed by 
celebrities or public intellectuals (e.g. Daniel Olbrychski, Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault 
and Jack Nicolson). 
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INSTITUTIONALIZING PROPAGANDA  
 
Solidarity¶VFDPSDLJQLQJ led to unprecedented changes to the state socialism in Poland: on 24 
October 1980 the movement was registered as a labor union on the basis of the agreement 
µ*GDĔVN$FFRUGV¶between the campaigning protesters and the authorities. Subsequently, 
6ROLGDULW\¶Vapproach to the practice propaganda altered. Despite initial financial difficulties, 
the union¶V campaigning became institutionalized. From this point onwards, campaigning 
strategy diversified and predominantly focused on: using the µ*GDĔVN$FFRUGV¶agreement to 
push for more freedom of expression, expansion of campaign networks and opportunities for 
high profile media features such as :DáĊVD¶VLQWHUYLHZs with Oriana Falacci (e.g. Chicago 
Tribune, 1981). 7RLPSOHPHQWWKHµ*GDĔVN$FFRUGV¶, the union focused on the management 
of public policy issues. For example, a spokesperson represented Solidarity on the steering 
committee  negotiating access to the broadcast media. In the meantime, Solidarity was 
making the most out of the policy item allowing the unioQ¶Vinternal publications to be 
uncensored and, in turn, enabling the existence of µGLVVHQWPHGLD¶(Janusz, interview, 2013).  
 
Solidatity continued expanding its networks: Janusz Onyszkiewicz, the XQLRQ¶VORQJHVW-
serving spokeperson (1981-9), led media relations; *LHG\PLQ-DEáRĔVNL set up the 
Department of Visual Information; Joanna Wojciechowicz established the Department for 
Information Dissemination made up of the Visual Arts Studio, the Poster and Propaganda 
Group and the Radio Solidarity Agency (the RAS). The Poster and Propaganda Group, 
coordinated by Zygmunt %áDĪek, was a campaigning network that saw itself as following the 
tradition of the war-time resistance by using publicity stunts, murals, self-made posters and 
political art ± all aimed at engaging with Solidarity¶V policies (Zygmunt, interview, 2012). In 
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April 1981, under the leadership of Arkadiusz Rybicki, the Bureau of Press Information (the 
BIPS) was formed. It was a hybrid of a µpress office¶ and a µnews agency¶(Giedymin, 
interview, 2012).  
 
DISCUSSION  
 
This article demonstrates that in addition to µGLVVHQWPHGLD¶, the practice of propaganda was 
inherent to 6ROLGDULW\¶VFDPSDLJQLQJ. Unlike professional government or corporate persuasive 
communication, the Solidarity movement¶s propaganda appeared to have been an 
µoccupational practice¶: it emerged in grass-root civic settings and displayed a unique 
approach to µLQIRUPDWLRQDQGLQIOXHQFHFDPSDLJQV¶. Yet, the background to the practice of 
6ROLGDULW\¶Vpropaganda was shaped by the movePHQW¶VSROLFLHV, culture of resistance, 
resourceful-ness of the protesters, and the expansion of networks. Although propaganda was 
strategic for the movement, the status of this practice was undermined by governmental 
µblack propaganda¶. Aiding the culturalistic stand of research on Solidarity (Kubik, 1994), 
this study adds to our understanding of campaigning in socialist Poland, as propaganda was 
one of the hallmarks of political engagement, responding to the demand for political action.  
 
6ROLGDULW\¶s decentralized campaign organization included: dissidents and the protest leaders, 
foreign media correspondents, clandestine organizations such as the KOR, but also the 
Catholic Church, artists, translators and the labor XQLRQV¶DEURDG7KLVERWWRP-up approach to 
the campaigning led to the emergence of multiple networks, which became power clusters for 
the campaign expansion. The multi-dimensional organization of propaganda reveals that 
Solidarity diversified strategies to engage multiple publics. Additionally, the flexible 
campaign organization workeGWRWKHPRYHPHQW¶VDGYDQWDJH, as it enabled responding to 
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incoming issues. ,QWKH6ROLGDULW\¶VSURWHVWFDPSDLJQ, propaganda became a µFXOWXUDO
FRQMXQFWXUH¶)RXFDXOW1967, p. 582), and those who practiced it, derived its power from 
multiple communicative and cultural sources. The findings also reveal an evolution in 
campaigning trajectory - from the protest sites to the institutionalization of propaganda.  
 
Unlike in liberal democracies, where VRFLDOPRYHPHQWV¶FDPSDLJQV tended to focus on 
engagement with multiple policy makers, Solidarity challenged the heart of government and 
its public policies. Its campaign strategies and tactics were inextricably linked with the strike 
goals. This political action and the struggle for the µ*GDĔVNAccords¶ was seen by 
campaigners as a learning curve in participatory politics in the midst of Cold War. In the light 
of findings of this study, the argument that campaigns are µvoices¶ heard over the market 
cacophony (Moloney, 2006) extends from market relations to industrial relations. To reshape 
them, Solidarity relied on self-presentation strategies to have its voices heard in making an 
input to public policies and building support for the independent labor union.  
 
Shifting industrial relations, driven by campaigning, demonstrate Solidarity¶VSURSDJDQGD 
real µpower effects¶ (Foucault, 1980). It mobilized the strike, enhanced political engagement 
and, in turn, provided input to public policies. $PRQJ6ROLGDULW\¶Vpropaganda practices 
were: media relations, celebrity endorsement, demonstrations, branding, publicity stunts and 
leafleting, to name but a few of its modalities (Tab. 2). But the findings of this study go 
beyond mapping out propaganda strategies and tactics: it traces the origins of and unfolds its 
evolution. For participants, the practice of propaganda was a liberating political action as the 
power effects of 6ROLGDULW\¶VSURSDJDQGDreached beyond the subversion of the August strike 
action: whilst the authorities claimed to have been the only legitimate ZRUNHUV¶
representation, the rise of Solidarity undermined this monopoly among public opinion.   
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The participants¶GLVFRXUVHVRQ6ROLGDULW\¶VSURSDJDQGDRISURWHVWreported this practice as an 
illustration a counter-conduct, which became a productive force for far-reaching societal 
transformations. Given the settings LQZKLFK6ROLGDULW\¶VSURSDJDQGDHPHUJHG, the 
transgressive qualities of this praxis stemmed from its abilities to mobilized political action 
and, by the virtue of its outcomes, it demonstrates how campaigning redefined 
communicative imbalances as well as policy issues in Poland (Aleksandrowicz et al., 2010). 
Finally, the transgressive feature of propaganda impacted the continuity of civic-ness in 
Polish political culture, even if interpreted from contemporary perspective. In 2010, the 
Centre for Public Opinion Research (2010: 17) surveyed Poles (n= 1803) and revealed that 
6ROLGDULW\¶Vpropaganda was associated with: strikes (26 %), industrial negotiations (7 %), 
media coverage (6%), participation in strikes (5%), national symbols, banners, and leaflets 
(3%), freedom of speech (2%), and critique of Solidarity (2%). The recall of 6ROLGDULW\¶V 
propaganda marks the continuity of resistance as its cultural legacy. 
 
While the findings of this study cannot be generalized, its approach to the study of 
propaganda can be fruitful for the analysis of social movements in historical and 
contemporary contexts. The legacy of the Solidarity movement transcends boundaries of time 
and space. This argument also applies to campaigning of 6ROLGDULW\¶VFRQWHPSRUDULHV- 
µ&KDUWHU¶¶ in Czechoslovakia and the East German networks of emerging movements such 
DVµ,QLWLDWLYHIRU3HDFH DQG+XPDQ5LJKWV¶DQGµ:RUNLQJ*URXS¶- which gave rise to the 
µ1HZ)RUXP¶LQWKHIDOORI7KHLUFDPSDLJQLQJFDQEHexplored with the use of 
Foucauldian analysis, as it permits the examination of transformations in practices such as 
circulation of publicity and collective symbols, and cultural legacies of their campaigns. With 
changing media landscapes, Foucauldian approach to the study of campaigning can be also 
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useful in the contemporary contexts ± his views on networks and power embedded within 
µLQIRUPDWLRQDQGLQIOXHQFHFDPSDLJQ¶0DQKHLPFDQEHXWLOL]HGLQWKHVHWWLQJVRI
multi-modal campaigns in the Middle East (2011). This can also include Solidarity as, in 
2011, its former leaders rallied media support for the Arab Spring. These transformations in 
WKHZD\V6ROLGDULW\¶VSURSDJDQGDSUDFWLFHVFRQWLQXHFDQEHVXEMHFWWRIXUWKHUDQDO\VLV 
(Reuters, 2011).  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Foucault¶Voeuvre is helpful in revealing the nuances of propaganda as the practice exerting 
power effects on public policy and industrial relations. In the 1980s, Foucault himself 
campaigned for Solidarity, whilst today his concepts enable us to revisit WKHPRYHPHQW¶V
campaigning through the lens of historically grounded and culturally sensitive interpretations. 
In doing so, the findings of this study substantiate the concept of µpropaganda of protest¶. By 
no means, however, this study exhausts DQDO\VLVRI6ROLGDULW\¶VFDPSDLJQLQJ. Future studies 
can be expanded by examination of µpropaganda of dissent¶, leading up to the outbreak of the 
August strike. Other promising research themes include 6ROLGDULW\¶VFDPSDLJQLQJoverseas; 
hybridization of the campaign genres; and FDPSDLJQHUV¶ career paths post-1989 or the 
intertwining relationship between campaigning and contemporary political cultures.  
 
Whilst this article primarily contributes to the debate on campaigning by social movements in 
WKHIRUPHUµ(DVWHUQ%ORF¶, its conceptual contribution goes beyond the boundaries of the 
region, as it advances the inquiry on the previously under-explored links between propaganda 
and protests. ThHNH\OHVVRQHPHUJLQJIURP6ROLGDULW\¶VOHJDFLHVLVWKDWcampaigning was 
inextricably linked to political action: without propaganda the August strike and a broader 
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Solidarity campaign would not have gained momentum. The movement¶VSURSDJDQGD
predominantly relied on self-presentation strategies; it was based on cultural appeal 
strategies, and it was enacted by networks of occupational campaigners. The most significant 
outcome of the campaign was the formation of the Solidarity labor union: it became a 
platform for reshuffling power relations, public policies and for the advancement of 
participatory political culture in Poland and beyond.   
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NOTES 
 
¹ 2¶)DUUHOOS VWDWHVWKDW³7KH term refers to a historically and conceptually 
VSHFLILFVHWRIUXOHVIRURUJDQL]LQJDQGSURGXFLQJGLIIHUHQWVHWRINQRZOHGJH´ 
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Table 2. Summary of propaganda strategies and tactics used by the Solidarity movement (1980-1981) 
 
PROTETS ACTION                                       CAMPAIGN TECHNIQUE                                                                                           PROPAGANDA GOALS 
Agitation                                                public speeches, leafleting, murals, protest slogans,                                                strike mobilization, following and support building 
                             letters announcing the outbreak of the strike 
 
Maintainig strike action             propaganda of µGHHG¶self-publication of demands, media statements,                                 industrial resistance, civic disobedience,   
                                                                dissemination of instructions about the organization of strikes                                                    behavioral measures 
 
Self-publication of demands           publicly display on boards, banners, news releases                                               building the campaign momentum, industrial policy draft,  
                     leafleting, industrial negotiations (proto-lobbying)                                                                 developing the protest manifesto  
                                                                                    
Media relations                               press conferences, spoksmenship, live interviews,                                          raising awareness, countering the government PR-propaganda  
                                                           media monitoring, media briefings, world-of-mount                                                     narratives, media commentaries and publicity                                         
                                                           vox populi, photo management and opportunities, 
              accreditation policy for journalists                                               
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Self-publicity                                                           publishing the strike bulletins                                        providing commentary, sharing news stories, 
                                   building sense of participation in policy making 
 
Collective identities building                           visual identity design and management,                                                    shaping the public face and identities of the movement 
                                                                use of national and religious symbols, sharing messages of  
support on industrial boards, posters, story telling                 
 
Coalition-building                                                  open letters and public statements,                                                                 building public support thorough personal 
                                                          esacalation of the strike action by several including many enterprises,                                        and institutional networks, securing  
     H[SHUWV¶VXSSRUW public statements by the Church,                                resources, including communicative resources 
                           forming some relationships with Western labour  unions                                                                 
 
Community building                      fundraising activities, celebrities and intellectual endorsements,         building sense of participation in policy changes,  
                                                  word- of- mouth, prohibition instructions, reprinting statements of support,                         building a moral high ground, building participatory 
                        SURSDJDQGDRIµGHHG¶via personalization of stories, e.g. Anna Walentynowicz)                                 attitudes and shaping behaviours 
 
Art, documentaries                                 self- publicized events: concerts and music performances                    up-NHHSLQJWKHVWULNH¶VPRPHQWXP 
and spiritual activities                                 displays of poetry, public masses, confessions                                             building sense of hope, raising awareness 
 
